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Intentional Employer Torts and
Workers' Compensation: A Legal
Morass
The workers' compensation acts were originally enacted in response
to the dismal plight faced by an employee injured on the job.' Prior to
the passage of these acts the employee's burden of proof2 and the vari-
ous common law defenses available to the employer3 erected a barrier
that in many cases proved insurmountable to the employee.4 Upon the
enactment of workers' compensation legislation the injured worker was
no longer required to prove negligence5 but in return surrendered
many actions previously available to him at common law.' Whether
intentional torts inflicted by an employer upon an employee were
among the actions relinquished by the worker has been a matter of
some controversy and the dispute has proven particularly vexatious in
the California courts.7
In the 1968 decision of Azevedo v. Abel," the Third District Court of
Appeal attempted to settle this area of the law9 by holding'0 that inten-
tional torts by an employer upon an employee were covered by the
California Workers' Compensation, Insurance, and Safety Act" (here-
inafter referred to as Workers' Compensation Act). Seven years later
however, the First District Court of Appeal in Maglulo v. Sufperior
Court, 2 held that the employee was entitled to either cumulative reme-
dies at common law and in workers' compensation, or alternative relief,
1. See generally 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §4.30 (2d ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as I LARSON].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION §1.05[I] (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HANNA]; 2 B. WiTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW §2 (8th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WnxmN].
6. See I LARSON, supra note 1, at §1.10.
7. See, eg., Magliulo v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975);
Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
8. 264 Cal. App. 2d, 451, 70 CaL Rptr. 710 (1968).
9. Comment, Azeyedo . AbeL" Denial of Employee's ight to Sue His Employerfor an Inten-
tional Tort, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1970).
10. See 264 Cal. App. 2d at 457-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714-16.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE §§3200-6002.
12. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
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giving the employee a choice between the two remedies.13 Both
Magliulo and Azevedo involved physical tort actions for assault and
battery,' 4 but later decisions have broadened the scope of the dispute to
encompass nonphysical torts as well.' 5
In 1978 the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Renteria v. County of Orange16 allowed a private action by the em-
ployee against the employer under the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, holding that workers' compensation was not meant
to be the exclusive remedy for that tort.17 In contrast, the First and
Second District Courts of Appeal decided that a claim for workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy of the employee where physical
illness and disability are alleged to accompany the emotional distress.' 8
Thus, the California appellate courts have dealt inconsistently with
the issue of employer liability for intentional torts when juxtaposed
with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. 9 The central
issue in these cases has been whether intentional employer torts should
be included within the purview of workers' compensation.
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress comes under the exclusive
remedies provision of workers' compensation and thus precludes a sep-
arate action at law. To this end, this comment will discuss: (1) the
history and purpose of workers' compensation; (2) the treatment by the
courts of intentional torts under the Workers' Compensation Acts; (3)
the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (4) the applicability of workers' compensation to the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The analysis presented in this
comment will demonstrate that the essence of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is incompatible with the theory and pur-
pose of workers' compensation. Before a determination of the applica-
bility of workers' compensation to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress can be made, a brief review of the history and pur-
pose of workers' compensation is needed.
13. Id. at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
14. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 624; 264 Cal. App. 2d at 453, 70 Cal. Rptr. at
711.
15. See, e.g., Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 198, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 487
(1979); Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 533, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828,
829 (1979); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 834-35, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 447
(1978).
16. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
17. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
18. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492; 88 Cal. App. 3d at 535-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at
831.
19. See text accompanying notes 64-69 and 81-97 infra. CAL. LAB. CODE §§3200-6002.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Historical Background
Employee injuries in the nineteenth century were characterized as a
"paradox of ever-increasing industrial injuries and ever-decreasing ju-
dicial remedies. .. ,"o While the great industrial revolution was pick-
ing up momentum, the "injured victims" were finding fewer remedies
for their disabilities.2 This reduction in employee recovery was in
large part linked to the rise of the three "common-law defenses": con-
tributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant
doctrine.2" Another 40 percent of the injuries suffered by employees
fell into the class of noncompensable injuries caused by inevitable acci-
dents and acts of God, adding to the dilemma faced by the injured
worker.23 In addition, it was difficult to get testimony in favor of the
employees since most witnesses were coemployees, who were naturally
reluctant to testify against their employers.24 Between the problems of
increasing difficulty in proving employer liability and a concomitant
growth in industrial injuries, the situation was painted by one commen-
tator as a "complete. . . picture of helplessness."2 5
B. Purposes of Workers' Compensation
After various efforts to lessen the harshness of the common law,26 the
workers' compensation statutes began to appear 27 based on the under-
lying theory of liability without fault.2 8 In Article XIV, Section 4 of the
California Constitution 9 this concept was stated by providing that the
legislature is
vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this consti-
20. 1 LARSON, supra note I, at §4.30.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. There were judicial and legislative efforts to abrogate the common law defenses. Id.
§§4.40, 4.50.
27. See id. §5.20. California's first workers' compensation act, the Roseberry Act, went into
effect on September 1, 1911. See CAL. STATS. 1911, c. 399, §§I, 2, at 796. This noncompulsory act
was followed by California's first compulsory act, effective in 1914. See CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 176,
at 279. An amendment to the California Constitution paved the way for a complete overhauling
of the workers' compensation system. CAL. CONST., art. XX, §521 (added 1911, amended 1918).
This provision now appears in an amended form at Article XIV, Section 4. Finally, the Work-
men's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act became effective as of January 1, 1918. CAL.
STATS. 1917, c. 586, at 831. It is this law which with its subsequent amendments has remained in
effect to the present day. See HANNA, supra note 5, at §1.041][d].
28. See HANNA, supra note 5, at §1.05[1]; WIraIN, supra note 5, at §2.
29. This provision was found in Article XX, Section 21 prior to 1976 and some of the quotes
in this comment refer to that former constitutional provision which is now found in Article XIV,
Section 4 of the California Constitution.
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tution, to create and enforce a complete system of workmen's com-
pensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and
enforce a liability on the part of any or all of their workmen for in-
jury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sus-
tained by said workmen in the course of their employment,
irrespective of the fault of any party.30
Decisions of the California Supreme Court have expounded further
upon the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. The court has
noted that the Act was proposed "to protect individuals from any 'spe-
cial risks' of employment"'3 1 and "to protect workmen, in proper cases,
from economic insecurity." 32 In Union Iron Works v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission,33 the California Supreme Court added the
economic thought that personal injury losses incident to an industry
is [sic] a part of the costs of production to be borne, just as the depre-
ciation and replacement of a machine is borne, by the industry itself,
which compensation will be included in the cost of the product of the
industry.34
It is evident from these pronouncements that the court viewed workers'
compensation as a reaction to the proliferation of noncompensable in-
dustrial injuries.
Another well-recognized purpose of workers' compensation is the
provision of prompt compensation for industrial injuries.35 Full cover-
age of medical expenses aids the injured employee with his rehabilita-
tion effort, while subsistence compensation helps fill the void in lieu of
his salary. As a result, the employee and his dependents are able to
stave off the financial hardship that previously attended disabling in-
dustrial injuries.36
C Statutory Framework of the Law
Labor Code Section 3600 lists the conditions for compensation that
must be met in order to establish the applicability of workers' compen-
sation to a particular injury.37
30. CAL. CONST., art. XIV, §4.
31. Laeng v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771,774, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377, 378, 494
P.2d 1, 2 (1972).
32. Marsh v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 217 Cal. 338, 345 (1933).
33. 190 Cal. 33 (1922).
34. Id. at 39.
35. See HANNA, supra note 5, at §1.05[3].
36. See id. §1.05[5][b], [c].
37. Section 3600 of the California Labor Code provides:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability
whatsoever to any person except as provided in Section 3706, shall, without regard to
negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising
out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the
injury proximately causes death, in those cases where the following conditions of com-
pensation occur.
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The conditions of compensation are: that both the employee and
employer must be subject to the relevant compensation provisions of
that division of the Labor Code;3" that the injury take place at a time
when the employee is performing a service which grows out of and is
incidental to his employment and is acting within the course of such
employment;39 and that the injury must be proximately caused by the
employment "either with or without negligence."'  There are also pro-
visions limiting the applicability of the workers' compensation jurisdic-
tion if the injury was self-inflicted, caused by the worker's intoxication,
or resulted from an altercation in which he was the aggressor; further-
more, death benefits are not recoverable where the employee "willfully
and deliberately caused his own death."4
Unlike most such acts,42 the California version provides for compen-
sation for "injury" 43 instead of "accident," and this seemingly innocu-
ous substitution has been the cause of much furor. Although this
language has been used to support the contention that intentional em-
ployer torts were meant to be covered by workers' compensation, one
commentator has stated that it was intended only to include all occupa-
tional diseases."
The exclusive remedy section on its face purports to make workers'
compensation the sole remedy available to the employee whenever the
conditions of compensation exist.4 5 However, another section within
(a) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and the employee are subject to
the compensation provisions of this division.(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out of
and incidental to his employment and is acting within the course of his employment(c) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without
negligence.(d) Where the injury is not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.
(e) Where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted.
(f) Where the employee has not willfully and deliberately caused his own death.
(g) Where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which the injured employee
is the initial physical aggressor.(h) Where the injury does not arise out of voluntary participation in any off-duty recre-
ational, social, or athletic activity not constituting part of the employee's work-related
duties, except where such activities are a reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or
impliedly required by, the employment The administrative director shall promulgate
reasonable rules and regulations requiring employers to post and keep posted in a con-
spicuous place or places a notice advising employees of the provisions of this subdivi-
sion. Failure of the employer to post such a notice shall not constitute an expression of
intent to waive the provisions of this subdivision.(Subdivision (h) added in 1978).
38. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600; see I LARSON, supra note 1, at §1.10.
39. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, at §1.10.
43. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600.
44. HANNA, supra note 5, at §1.0413][c].
45. Section 3601 of the California Labor Code provides as follows:(a) Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensa-
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the act provides for express exceptions to this concept of exclusivity.
This provision also has been the source of much dispute among the
various appellate courts in regard to intentional torts by an employer. 6
The controversy revolves around these express exceptions and whether
any are implied for injuries that were never meant to be enveloped by
workers' compensation.47
Of great importance here is Labor Code Section 4553 which provides
for a one-half increase in compensation benefits for the "serious and
wilful misconduct" of the employer or one of his enumerated agents.48
Only two states have provisions similar to this statute.49 This particular
code section has been the source of much of the controversy surround-
ing intentional torts by employers and plays a significant role in the
analysis of the cases.
tion, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in Section 3706, the
exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any
other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment, except that
an employee, or his dependents in the event of his death, shall, in addition to the right to
compensation against the employer, have a right to bring an action at law for damages
against such other employee, as if this division did not apply, in either of the following
cases:
(1) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked
physical act of aggression of such other employee.
(2) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the intoxication of such other
employee.
(b) An act which will not sustain an independent action for damages against such other
employee under paragraph (I) or (2) of subdivision (a) of this section may nevertheless
be the basis of a finding of serious and willful misconduct under Section 4553 or 4553.1 if
(1) such other employee is established to be one through whom the employer may be
charged under Section 4553; (2) such act of such other employee shall be established to
have been the proximate cause of the injury or death; and (3) such act is established to
have been of a nature, kind, and degree sufficient to support a finding of serious and
willful misconduct under Section 4553 or 4553.1.
(c) In no event, either by legal action or by agreement whether entered into by such
other employee or on his behalf, shall the employer be held liable, directly or indirectly,
for damages awarded against, or for a liability incurred by such other employee under
paragraph (I) or (2) of subdivision (a) of this section.
(d) No employee shall be held liable, directly or indirectly, to his employer, for injury
or death of a coemployee except where the injured employee or his dependents obtain a
recovery under subdivision (a) of this section.
CAL. LAB. CODE §3601.
46. See notes 69 and 84-87 and accompanying text infra.
47. See Magliulo v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 772-73, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 630 (1975).
But see Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 459, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710, 715 (1968).
48. Section 4553 of the California Labor Code reads as follows:
The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half where
the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful misconduct of any of the
following:
(a) The employer, or his managing representative.
(b) If the employer is a partnership, on the part of one of the partners or a managing
representative or general superintendent thereof.
(c) • If the employer is a corporation, on the part of an executive, managing officer, or
general superintendent thereof. But such increase of award shall in no event exceed ten
thousand dollars ($10,000); together with costs and expenses incident to procurement of
such award, not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250).
49. Aiuz. REV. STAT. §23-1022; MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. c. 152, §28.
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The development of workers' compensation initially revolved
around physical injuries. Problems arose, however, when causes of ac-
tion were brought against the employer for physical intentional torts
committed by him. The analysis used by the courts in dealing with
these problems provided the foundation upon which the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress cases dealing with workers' compensation
were decided.
PHYSICAL INTENTIONAL TORTS AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
.A. Development of the Idea
In 1951, Conway v. Globin5° was decided by the Third District Court
of Appeal. In that case the defendant employer allegedly assaulted the
plaintiff, breaking two of his teeth. The plaintiff brought an action at
law, but the employer defended on the theory that the only remedy
available to the employee was workers' compensation.51 The court al-
lowed the damage action stating that an intentional tort was not a risk
or condition incident to the employment. 2 Moreover, the court added
that for assault to be a risk or condition of employment would not only
work
to sanction indirectly conduct of the employer which is both tortious
and criminal, but also would ... permit the employer to use the
Workmen's Compensation Act to shield him from his larger civil lia-
bility, which liability would exist independent of the common law
defenses to personal injury actions by employees which prevailed
prior to the advent of the Workmen's Compensation Act.5 3
The Conway decision was reversed 15 years later inAzevedo v. Indus-
trialAccident Commission54 (hereinafter referred to as Azevedo 1) by a
reconstituted Third District Court of Appeal. Thereafter Azevedo v.
Abel5 5 (hereinafter referred to as Azevedo 11) established workers'
compensation as the exclusive remedy of the employee whenever the
conditions of compensation were found to exist regardless of the inten-
tional nature of the tort. 6
The facts in the Azevedo cases are relatively simple. On May 6, 1964,
Mrs. Alice Azevedo was employed as the saleslady-manager at defend-
ant Emanuel Abel's dress shop. Mrs. Azevedo, the plaintiff, had
conversed with a dissatisfied customer while Abel was absent. Upon
50. 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951).
51. Id. at 496, 233 P.2d at 613.
52. Id. at 498, 233 P.2d at 614.
53. Id.
54. 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 52 Cal. Rptr. 283, 286 (1966).
55. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
56. Id. at 460, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
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his return the defendant was told about the telephone conversation and
became angered, whereupon he kicked the plaintiff in the lower back."
Mrs. Azevedo suffered extensive injuries necessitating approximately
$900 in medical bills during the eleven months following the injury."
InAzevedo I, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation as
a result of the intentional injury inflicted by the employer. Subse-
quently, Mrs. Azevedo also filed a civil damage action against her em-
ployer in Superior Court. The Industrial Accident Commission
ultimately dismissed the claim for workers' compensation because the
injuries were the result of the employer's intentional act.59 The dismis-
sal was correct under the Conway rationale, but the appellate court re-
versed in an opinion that overruled Conway.6
The court stated that the legislature intended workers' compensation
to be the sole remedy for intentional torts due to the use of the word
"injury" and the use of the phrase "irrespective of the fault of any
party" in the legislative and constitutional provisions.61 The court also
found that the inclusion of the latter phrase, coupled with the penalty
provisions for "serious and wilful misconduct" of the employer, com-
pelled the reversal of Conway, especially in light of the rule that the
workers' compensation laws are to be liberally construed in favor of
aiding the injured worker.62 This "liberal" construction worked to pre-
clude the employee's private action when the conditions of compensa-
tion coalesced.63
The court in Azevedo I decided that the Workers' Compensation
Commission had jurisdiction when an intentional assault committed by
an employer upon an employee was an act "fairly traceable to an inci-
dent of the employment" and not "the result of personal grievances
unconnected with the employment." 4 Pursuant to this standard, the
commission's order to dismiss was annulled and its jurisdiction over
the matter was reinstated.65 Azevedo II decided the one critical issue
remaining unresolved by Azevedo I whether "the commission's juris-
diction [and the remedy] is exclusive or whether superior court jurisdic-
tion is in addition or an alternative to jurisdiction of the
commission. '66
57. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 372, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 371-72, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
60. Id. at 373-74, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
61. Id. at 374, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
62. Id.
63. 264 Cal. App. 2d at 460, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
64. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 376-77, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
65. Id. at 377, 52 Cal. Rp~r. at 288.
66. Id. at 373 n.1, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 285 n.1. After.Azevedo I the superior court dismissed Mrs.
Azevedo's damage action pursuant to a defense motion, while in the workers' compensation pro-
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The court concluded in Azevedo II'that there was no issue as to the
substantive entitlement to workers' compensation benefits.67 Mrs.
Azevedo urged concurrent jurisdiction by the two tribunals along with
concurrent liability and sought civil damages in addition to her com-
pensation benefits. She argued that to confine the employee to workers'
compensation shielded the employer from the "common law conse-
quenqes of his intentional act," such as "general and punitive dam-
ages."' 68 The court was unpersuaded stating that to allow "[a] damage
suit as an alternative or additional source of compensation, becomes
permissible only by carving a judicial exception in an uncarved stat-
ute." Again the court placed its reliance on the "penalty for serious
and wilful misconduct" as being a sufficient sanction against deliberate
torts. Labor Code Sections 3600 and 3601 were declared to be "the
exclusive source of entitlement for covered injuries" since the policy
choice was to provide the penalty in exchange for general damages.69
B. Choice of Alternative Remedies
The reasoning of the Azevedo decisions was challenged in the First
District Court decision of Magliulo v. Superior Court.70 There the court
concluded that until "an award of workmen's compensation is made
and satisfied. . . or until a judgment is recovered in a civil suit for
damages. . . the remedies can be treated as cumulative or at least alter-
native."71
The plaintiff, a waitress in defendant's restaurant, alleged that she
was assaulted by her employer. Afterwards she filed an application
with the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to adjudicate the
claim but her employer filed an answer contesting the presence of the
conditions of compensation.72  Thereafter, the plaintiff fied a com-
plaint in superior court seeking $25,000 exemplary damages. The de-
fendant's answer alleged that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was for
ceedings Mrs. Azevedo was awarded temporary and permanent disability benefits. 264 Cal. App.
2d at 453, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 711. Mrs. Azevedo appealed the dismissal of her superior court action
and Abel's insurer petitioned for review of the compensation award. The two actions were consol-
idated for review by the appellate court in Azevedo H. Id. The employer's insurance company's
contention was rejected when the appellate court affirmed the award of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board. The court held that Insurance Code Section 533 and Civil Code Section
1668 prohibiting insurance and indemnification of willful injury did not apply to workers' com-
pensation. The court decided that this holding was necessary in order to give effect to Insurance
Code Section 11661 which prohibits an employer from insuring against the additional compensa-
tion which is assessed for "serious and willful misconduct" pursuant to Labor Code Section 4553.
ld. at 457-58, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
67. Id. at 456, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
68. Id. at 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
69. Id. at 459, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
70. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
71. Id. at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
72. Id. at 762-63, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24.
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workers' compensation.73
The employer contended that the damage action should be stayed so
as to allow the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to determine
whether the alleged injuries arose out of and occurred in the course of
employment. The position of the employer coincided with the decision
in the case of Scott v. IndustrialAccident Commission.74 The court in
Magliulo distinguished Scott on the grounds that the tort involved in
that case was simple negligence and such a tort obviously was within
the purview of workers' compensation when the Section 3600 condi-
tions of compensation were present.7 5 If such conditions were not pres-
ent, the remedy was one at law.76 Hence, the concept of mutually
exclusive remedies was entirely correct where negligence was in-
volved,77 in contrast to an assault where the Magliulo court declared
that a final determination of jurisdiction by one tribunal would not pre-
clude the exercise of jurisdiction by the other.78
The court then discussed Carter v. Superior Court79 which had been
decided after Conway and prior to Azevedo. In Carter the court had
held that the first tribunal whose jurisdiction was invoked in an assault
case could proceed while the other could not.80 The Magliulo court
found the Carter rule to be inconsistent with the rule in Section 3601
which allowed the cumulative remedies of workers' compensation and
a common law damage action when the defendant was a fellow em-
ployee.81 Further, the court in Magliulo asserted that "if the employee
can recover both compensation and damages caused by an intentional
assault by a fellow worker, he should have no less right because the
fellow worker happens to be his boss."8 2 In addition, the court pointed
out8 3 that exceptions to exclusivity existed where the employee was as-
73. Id.
74. 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956). The Scott decision involved a civil action for damages
and a subsequent workers' compensation proceeding. The court held that the workers' compensa-
tion should be stayed until the superior court decided which tribunal had jurisdiction over the
matter since its jurisdiction was invoked first. The rationale for this holding was as follows:
The only point of concurrent jurisdiction of the two tribunals appears to befiurisdition to
determine jurisdiction; jurisdiction once determined will be exclusive, not concurrent
. If at the time of the accident there was no workmen's compensation coverage, then
the commission is without jurisdiction to grant relief, and if there was such coverage then
the superior court is without jurisdiction and must leave the parties to pursue their reme-
dies before the commission...
Id. at 83, 293 P.2d at 22.
75. See 47 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 623. See text accompanying notes 37-41
supra.
76. Id. at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598 (1956).
80. Id. at 355-56, 298 P.2d at 601.
81. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 770-72, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 628-30.
82. Id. at 773, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
83. See id. at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
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saulted by a customer,84 a supervisor, 85 and possibly a working part-
ner. 6 The court found the reason for allowing these suits was
applicable equally to acts by an employer and criticized Azevedo II for
"erecting a straw man of exclusiveness" and thereby creating "an os-
tensible syllogism which leads to the preclusion of what was sought."8
Further the Magliulo court criticized the Azevedo II court's interpre-
tation of the clause providing for compensation "irrespective of the
fault of any party." s The Supreme Court decision in Mathews v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board9 was relied upon9" for the
proposition that
the use of the phrase "irrespective of the fault of any party" in sec-
tion 21 was intended only to give the Legislature power to grant ben-
efits unhampered by common law tort concepts of negligence; it has
never been construed as prohibiting the legislature from increasing,
decreasing or even eliminating awards based upon the willful wrong-
doing of a party.91
On the basis of this declaration by the Supreme Court,9 2 the court in
Magliulo concluded that a reading of the exclusivity provisions of Sec-
tion 3601 in light of Section 3600 which refers to "without regard to
negligence," allowed the courts to determine the liability of an em-
ployer for an intentional tort inflicted upon an employee.93
At this point there was one more major conflict between Magliulo
and Azevedo II: the provision for a 50% increase in compensation ben-
efits for the "serious and wilful misconduct" of the employer. 94 The
Magliulo court was confident that the provision was meant to apply
only where the conduct fell somewhere "between ordinary negligence
and an intentional tort."9" None of the early case law definitions had
ever referred to an intentional assault as being included in the defini-
tion of "serious and wilful misconduct. 96 Rather, the court held that
the provision was intended to be an incentive for the employer to pro-
vide a safer place of employment. Application of the "serious and wil-
84. See CAL. LAB. CODE §3852.
85. See id. §3601.
86. See Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 977, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 50,
500 P.2d 1386, 1394 (1972).
87. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
88. Id.
89. 6 Cal. 3d 719, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165 (1972).
90. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 768-69, 777, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28, 634.
91. 6 Cal. 3d at 728, 493 P.2d at 1170, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
92. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 769, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
93. Id.
94. CAL. LAB. CODE §4553.
95. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 778-79, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
96. See Keeley v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 55 Cal. 2d 261, 359 P.2d 34, 10 Cal. Rptr. 636
(1961); Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953); E.
Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ac. Comm., 184 Cal. 180 (1920).
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ful misconduct" clause to intentional assault was held not to fulfill such
a purpose.97
The existing precedents were construed strictly by the M'agliulo court
although it is difficult at best to reconcile Magliulo and Azevedo HJ.98
The court placed Azeyedo If into the category of a workers' compensa-
tion award that already had been made and satisfied.99 In contrast to
the Magliulo court's attempt to reconcile the two decisions, however,
the Magliulo court also opined that the claim for alternative or cumula-
tive remedies advanced by Mrs. Azevedo is "a preferable solution" and
that it would have adopted such a contention had the question been
one of first impression.100 The court in Azevedo 11, however, had disal-
lowed the possibility of a damage suit as an alternative whenever the
"conditions of compensation" were found to exist, even if an award of
workers' compensation benefits had not been made and satisfied.10l
Under this reasoning neither Mrs. Azevedo nor someone similarly situ-
ated could pursue a private damage action once it was determined that
the conditions of workers' compensation were met.
In the case of assault by an employer upon an employee, it can be
seen that the California judiciary has developed two conflicting lines of
thought on the remedies available to the employee. 102 One line makes
the remedies mutually exclusive, 0 3 while the other allows them to be
cumulative to the extent of joint jurisdiction and alternative in the
sense of pursuing either remedy to final judgment. 104 Clearly, both the-
ories cannot be compatible with the idea of workers' compensation be-
cause these two theories of recovery are mutually exclusive. 105 Looked
at in terms of the history and purpose of workers' compensation, the
reasoning of the court in the Magliulo case appears more logical in
allowing the worker to pursue a civil remedy for the intentional tort.
The theory of workers' compensation recognizes that in today's in-
dustrial environment workers will be injured. 0 6 The cost of this injury,
as stated by the California Supreme Court, should be borne by that
97. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
98. Id. at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 777, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34.
101. See 264 Cal. App. 2d at 460, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
102. See note 7, supra.
103. The Third District Court of Appeal is the only appellate court currently following the
exclusivity theory.
104. Along with the First District which decided Magliulo, the Second District in Meyer v.
Graphic Arts Intern., Etc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 178, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597, 598-99 (1979), and the
Fifth District in Douglas v. E. & J Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 112, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 802
(1977), have embraced the Magliulo decision afflirmatively.
105. See notes 87-100 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
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industry."°7 For the state to include intentional torts within workers'
compensation then seems to indicate that intentional torts are also in-
evitable injuries to be absorbed in the cost of production.1"8 This rea-
soning leads to the inference that by allowing industry to absorb the
cost of intentional torts merely as an incident of production, the courts
are saying that intentional torts are acceptable in the work environ-
ment.109 If indeed intentional torts are covered by workers' compensa-
tion, the payment of an insurance premium is not as great a deterrent to
the employer as the payment of damages in a tort suit would be. Thus,
encompassing intentional torts within workers' compensation tends to
encourage rather than discourage such torts.
The California Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether either
the Azevedo or Magiulo theory will be followed. Yet different Califor-
nia appellate courts have applied these theories to workers' compensa-
tion cases involving nonphysical torts in which an element of intent
was present.110 Before discussing the impact of workers' compensation
on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is necessary
to discuss the development of this relatively new tort in California case
law.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Development in California
The law was slow to recognize that a person's interest in peace of
mind was entitled to legal protection, independent of its connection
with any other tort. 11 Only when some other tort was committed, such
as assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction, would the courts
allow a tort recovery to include damages resulting from emotional dis-
tress.1 12 The California courts also allowed recovery for serious emo-
tional distress where compensable physical injuries were shown to
exist.'1 3  Eventually in State Rubbish Collectors Association v.
Siliznoff,114 the Supreme Court of California announced that "where
mental suffering constitutes a major element of damages it is anoma-
lous to deny recovery because the defendant's intentional conduct fell
short of producing some physical injury.""' This decision established
107. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
108. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
109. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
110. See notes 144-187 and accompanying text infra.
111. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 49 (4th ed. 1971).
112. Id. at 52.
113. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793,795, 216 P.2d 571-72 (1950); Emden v. Vitz,
88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 319, 198 P.2d 696, 700 (1948).
114. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
115. Id. at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
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the distinct tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
court did state that a jury could determine outrageous conduct as well
as a physician could diagnose physical manifestations." 16
Subsequent appellate decisions have defined more clearly the ele-
ments of the tort and the type of behavior necessary to allow recovery
without physical manifestations of harm. The elements of a prima fa-
cie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outra-
geous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless
disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe
emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress.' '7 The first element, which deals with outrageous
conduct, is of primary importance to the cause of action.
In Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 18 the court identified three dis-
tinct instances in which behavior could reach the limits of outrageous-
ness. The first takes place when the defendant abuses a relation or
position which gives him power to damage the plaintiffs interest. 19
The second instance is when the defendant knows the plaintiff is sus-
ceptible to injuries as a result of mental distress.' 20 The third situation
constituting outrageous conduct is where the defendant acts intention-
ally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to re-
sult in illness through mental distress.1 2'
B. Outrageous Conduct in Employment Environs
Outrageous conduct in an employment setting was the subject of liti-
gation well before the subject cases of this comment.' 22 The key case
dealing with intentional infliction of emotional distress on the job was
the California Supreme Court decision in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,
Inc. 3 The high court determined that a cause of action had been
stated "which reasonably could lead the trier of fact to conclude that
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, having a severe and
traumatic effect upon plaintiffs emotional tranquility."'2l 4 The facts al-
leged by the plaintiff showed that he was a Black truck driver employed
116. See id.
117. See Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal, 3d 493, 497-98, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88, 90 (1970); State Rubbish, etc., Ass'n v. Silizaoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,337-38, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952); Neviby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 296, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552
(1976).
118. 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976).
119. Id. at 297, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
120.. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Alcom v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1970); Agarwal v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1978) (hearinggranted by the
California Supreme Court); Toney v. State, 54 Cal. App. 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976).
123. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
124. Id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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by Anbro Engineering, Inc., and a shop steward in the Teamster's
Union. In his latter capacity he allegedly told another employee not to
drive a certain truck to the job site because the employee was not a
union member. When the plaintiff told defendant Palmer, a field su-
perintendent, what he had told the employee, Palmer allegedly shouted
at the plaintiff in a "rude, violent and insolent manner." Palmer called
Alcorn, the plaintiff, a "goddam 'nigger'" and fired him. When Alcorn
recounted the incident to defendant Thomas Anderson, Jr., Anbro's
secretary, Anderson was alleged to have ratified Palmer's acts on behalf
of Anbro. 125 The plaintiff further alleged that he suffered humiliation,
mental anguish and emotional and physical distress. 126 As a result, Al-
corn claimed to have been sick for several weeks thereafter suffering
from shock, nausea, and insomnia, as well as an inability to work. 27
Though the case did not involve any issue of workers' compensation,
it is a key one in this area of the law for several reasons: (1) the court's
emphasis upon the absence of a requirement of physical illness or disa-
bility;128 (2) the fact that the court imputed the conduct of a supervisory
employee to hold the company liable; 29 and (3) the special degree of
protection from "insult and oitrage" that an employee is entitled to
from his employer.13 0 Despite plaintiffs allegations of inability to work
and physical manifestations of harm, the court focused on the nonphysi-
cal nature of the tort alleged, thereby suggesting that the invasion of
mental and emotional tranquility alone is a sufficient basis in a tort
action of this kind.13 ' After recognizing that physical manifestations of
harm were recoverable in an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress the court added that:
Moreover, the courts in this state have also acknowledged the right to
recover damages for emotional distress alone, without consequent
physical injuries, in cases involving extreme and outrageous inten-
tional invasions of one's mental and emotional tranquility. 132
Further, the allegations that the outrageous acts were ratified on be-
half of Anbro were found sufficient to state a cause of action against the
company for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 33 This impu-
tation of liability is of great importance since some of the employment
relationship cases discussed herein involve a supervisory employee
125. Id. at 496-97, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
126. Id at 497, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
129. See id. at 497-98, 468 P.2d at 217-18, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
130. Id. at 498 n.1, 468 P.2d at 218 n.1, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.1.
131. See id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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rather than an actual employer. 34
The final item of importance determined in A/corn was that abuse of
the employment relationship can constitute outrageous conduct. 135
The court made it clear that an employee was entitled to special protec-
tion from such conduct by virtue of the employment relationship:
"Thus, plaintiff's status as an employee should entitle him to a greater
degree of protection from insult and outrage than if he were a stranger
to defendants."' 136
The subsequent appellate court decision in Agarwal v. Johnson 37 re-
stated the Alcorn court's proposition concerning vicarious liability'38
and further held that even if there was no ratification or authorization
of such acts, as was the case in Alcorn, the employer could be held
liable for the wilful misconduct of his employees acting in a managerial
capacity.139 The case reiterated the concept that abuse of the employ-
ment relationship was a type of outrageous conduct which would estab-
lish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 '
Given that intentional infliction of emotional distress is characterized
by an invasion of mental tranquility,' 4' that tort would appear to fall
outside the realm of workers' compensation which is geared towards
work-related injuries of a physical nature.142 Furthermore, in light of
the controversy surrounding the application of workers' compensation
to intentional torts, the argument against inclusion of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress within that statutory scheme appears even
stronger. Three recent appellate court decisions 43 have done little to
settle this area of the law, because of their failure to reach a consensus
regarding the disposition of cases involving these controversies.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIsTRESS AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: RECENT CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Private Action Allowed
Renteria v. County of Orange,'" the first decision to discuss the
134. Two such cases are Gates Y. Trans Video, 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979)
and 4garwal v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1978).
135. 2 Cal. 3d at 497-98, 468 P.2d at 217-18.
136. Id. at 498 n.2, 468 P.2d at 218 n.2, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.2.
137. 28 Cal. App. 3d 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1978). See also Toney v. State, 54 Cal. App. 3d
779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976).
138. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
139. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 528. 4ccord, Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21
Cal. App. 3d 541, 549-50, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588, 592 (1971).
140. See 81 Cal. App. 3d at 525, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
141. See notes 113-15 & 132 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
143. See note 15 supra.
144. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
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ramifications of an action against an employer for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, held that a private suit was not Precluded by the
exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation. 45 In Renteria, the
plaintiff was employed as an investigator for the Orange County De-
partment of Social Services. He alleged that his employer and fellow
employees intentionally treated him in a rude and degrading manner,
placed him under surveillance, subjected him to lengthy interrogations,
and discriminated against him because of his Mexican-American de-
scent. 14 6 It was alleged that this was done in order to cause the plaintiff
to resign or be fired, and to cause him humiliation, mental anguish, and
emotional distress. 147 The defendants demurred on several grounds in-
cluding an assertion that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The trial court agreed and
sustained the demurrer resulting in the dismissal of the case. 148
The appellate court reversed, concluding "that an employee's cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress constitutes an
implied exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of Labor Code
Section 360 1.'149 This theory was based on the finding that emotional
distress was not compensable in a workers' compensation proceeding' 50
and on the assumption that the legislature could not have intended to
preclude recovery for extreme and outrageous conduct. 15'
In its decision, the court concurred in a criticism previously made of
the Azevedo II reasoning, by finding that situations exist where inten-
tional torts come under the sole jurisdiction of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act and yet are completely noncompensable.'5 2 Intentional
infliction of emotional distress would be one of the noncompensable
torts under Azevedo Ii in light of the Renteria court's finding that there
was no decisional or statutory authority for the proposition that mental
suffering, as such, is a compensable injury in a workers' compensation
proceeding. 53 This latter point is reinforced by the fact that damages
in a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are re-
coverable even absent a showing of accompanying physical harm15 4
while workers' compensation is directed only towards disabling injuries
of a physical nature.'55
145. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
146. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48.
149. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
150. Id. at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
151. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
152. See Id. at 839, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
153. See id.
154. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
155. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, at §2.40.
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The Renteria court then addressed the issue of damages that were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of workers' compensation yet noncom-
pensable therein.' 56 This class of damages, such as pain and suffering
and loss of consortium, was lost during the grant of the benefits of
workers' compensation. 7 In Williams v. State Compensation Insurance
Fund,5 8 the court held that a work-connected injury could not be di-
vided into separate elements of damage even though some were unre-
lated to earning capacity and, therefore, noncompensable in a workers'
compensation proceeding.5 9 In Williams an injury to the groin that
caused the loss of sexual performance was found to be just such an
injury.' 60 As a result, the employee's action at law was dismissed upon
the force of the court's reasoning that workers' compensation was the
exclusive remedy available to the employee regardless of whether the
injury was compensable in respect to all elements of damage. 16 1
The Renteria court made an important distinction between the facts
before the court and those in the Williams case. Rather than an iso-
lated type of noncompensable physical injury, the Renteria case dealt
with "an entire class of civil wrongs outside the contemplation of the
workers' compensation system."' 62 Moreover, the court seized upon
the aspect of intentional wrongdoing central to the controversy sur-
rounding the Azevedo-Magliulo decisions as another reason to set Wil-
liams apart from Renteria. Since emotional distress is not a
compensable injury, the court also held that the "serious and willful
misconduct" provision would be a poor deterrent where "50 percent of
nothing is still nothing."' 63
The court expressed its complete disagreement with the notion that
such an outcome could have been intended by the legislature because:
[w]hile it is possible to believe that the Legislature intended that em-
ployees lose their right to compensation for certain forms of negli-
gently or accidentally inflicted physical injuries in exchange for a
system of workers' compensation featuring liability without fault,
compulsory insurance, and prompt medical care, it is much more dif-
ficult to believe that the Legislature intended the employee to surren-
der all right to any form of compensation for mental suffering caused
by extreme and outrageous misconduct by the employer." 4
Thus, the Renteria court concluded that the tort of intentional infliction
156. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 840-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
157. See note 155 supra.
158. 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
159. Id. at 121-22, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 123, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
162. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
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of emotional distress does not come under the provisions of workers'
compensation.
B. Preclusion of Private Action
Shortly after the ]?enteria decision was rendered, the First and Sec-
ond District Courts of Appeal dealt with the issue of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and the applicability of workers'
compensation. 165 Both of the courts held that the exclusive remedy was
workers' compensation because the employee had alleged physical ill-
ness and disability. If workers' compensation could provide any rem-
edy at all, the courts theorized that the worker was forbidden from
bringing an action at law against the offending employer. 166
In Ankeny v. Lockheed Missles and Space Co.,16 7 the plaintiff alleged
that defendant deprived him of his job as union steward, transferred
him from one job to another, passed him over for promotion twice,
assigned him to tasks not appropriate to his labor grade, terminated his
employment and subjected him to "many other acts of harassment."' 168
The plaintiff further alleged that these acts were intended to cause emo-
tional distress and were ratified by Lockheed.' 69 Allegations of physi-
cal illness and "some permanent disability" caused by the above acts
were enough to satisfy the trial court in sustaining the defendant's de-
murrer, on the grounds that "workers' compensation was the plaintiff's
only remedy." 170 On appeal the court refused to allow the plaintiff a
civil cause of action pursuant to the Magliulo decision by limiting that
decision's applicability to cases involving physical assault. 7'
The Ankeny court then disposed of Renteria by asserting that the
latter decision was correct insofar as neither physical illness nor disabil-
ity was alleged, whereas the former case involved allegations of com-
pensable physical injury and disability.'72 Though physical harm was
alleged, the Ankeny court failed to deal with the theory that the essence
of the action and of the tort lies in intentional infliction of emotional
distress which is outside of the Workers' Compensation Act.173
The last court to consider the issue in the emotional distress actions
165. Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal.' Rptr. 486 (1979); Ankeny v.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979).
166. See 93 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 491; 88 Cal. App. 3d at 535-36, 151 Cal.
Rptr. at 831.
167. 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979).
168. Id. at 534, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 534-35, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
172. Id. at 535-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
173. See id. at 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
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was the Second District Court of Appeal in Gates v. Trans Video
Corp.74 The decision relied on Ankeny as a correct statement of the
law since physical illness and disability had been alleged. 17' However,
there was an added twist to the fact pattern in that the employee al-
ready was disabled when the alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress occurred. He had suffered a back injury while on the job for
his employer. Thereafter, he received both workers' compensation and
sick pay.176 When the sick pay ran out the employee went to see the
general manager and an argument arose. Following this altercation,
Gates, the employee, was informed by mail that he was fired. Upon
returning some company property and picking up personal belongings
at work, Gates again was confronted by Block, the general manager,
who in the presence of several employees repeatedly shouted at the
plaintiff, "Get out."'1 7 7 Testimony at trial showed the plaintiff had be-
come a changed man as a result of the above events. He spoke daily of
his termination, his condition became worse, he was preoccupied con-
stantly with the above incidents, his friends visited him less frequently,
and his sexual relations with his wife deteriorated. Medical tests
showed no physical cause for the problems and eventually the plaintiff
had to consult a psychologist and a neurologist.17 8 The suit resulted in
a $40,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff-employee. 179 This judgment
was reversed upon the grounds that the Ankeny decision applied to the
facts of this case. I 0
Before the Gates court made its determination as to exclusivity of
remedies it had to decide whether the injury took place within the
course and scope of employment.' Even though Gates had ceased
working and had been fired before the second altercation, the court
concluded that the incidents described were "directly connected with
the employment relationship and being incident thereto, the employee
is entitled to the protection of workers' compensation until he had left
the premises."' I 2 Once this decision was reached the court's reasoning
basically reiterated the Ankeny analysis.'1 3 However, a factual distinc-
tion in the two cases is worthy of note.
In Gates, the plaintiff had suffered an injury prior to and separate
174. 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979).
175. Id. at 204, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
176. Id. at 198-99, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88.
177. Id. at 199-200, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
178. Id. at 201, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
179. Id.
180. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
181. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
182. Id. at 203-04, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 491. See also Mitchell v. Hizer, 73 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505,
140 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793 (1977).
183. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 204-06, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
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from the emotional distress. His back injury indisputably was subject
to workers' compensation. 184 By no means could the emotional distress
be causally linked to the initial on-the-job injury, but the court failed to
clearly identify whether the alleged physical harm referred to the back
injury or to physical manifestations of the emotional distress.'"5 Such a
separation of injuries has been recognized in California 186 and by a
leading commentator on the subject. 18 7 Therefore, if the alleged physi-
cal injury that the court referred to was the back injury, then the rever-
sal was decided erroneously in light of the controlling authorities. It
would have been proper to strike the allegations of physical disability
pertaining to the back injury but that deletion would not have necessi-
tated barring the entire action. If the allegations of physical illness and
disability referred to physical consequences of the emotional distress,
the Gates decision was on all fours with Ankeny. This ambiguity was
not resolved within the opinion.
An analogy to a deceit case involving workers' compensation is help-
ful to illustrate that intentional torts are separable from physical disa-
bility actions. In Ramey v. General Petroleum Corporation8 ' an
employee had suffered an injury caused by a third party that was com-
pensable under workers' compensation. The employer deceived the
employee, however, leading him to believe that a coemployee had in-
jured him. The purpose of this deception was to avoid the indemnity
liability that the employer had contracted to assume if the third party
had been sued by the employee.' 9 In such an instance, the court de-
cided, the intentional injury is separable from the workers' compensa-
tion injury thereby giving the employee two actions, one at law for the
intentional tort and one in workers' compensation for the initial in-
jury.190 This is so, the court noted, for three reasons: the legislature
never intended fraud to be a risk of employment; the injury caused by
fraud does not arise out of the employment; nor is the fraud proxi-
mately caused by the employment as these terms are used in the work-
ers' compensation statutes.' 9 ' Similarly, a case involving intentional
infliction of emotional distress that occurred in the work environment
is not necessarily covered by the exclusive remedies provision of work-
ers' compensation because intentional torts such as deceit and inten-
184. Id. at 198-99, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88.
185. See id. at 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
186. Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d 787 (1959).
187. A. Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen'r Compensation, 12 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Nonphysical Torts].
188. 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d 787 (1959).
189. Id. at 392-93, 343 P.2d at 790.
190. See notes 185-187 and accompanying text supra.
191. See 173 Cal. App. 2d at 402-03, 343 P.2d at 797.
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tional infliction of emotional distress are outside the risk of
employment contemplated by the legislature.'92 Additionally, if the in-
tentional tort of deceit does not arise out of the employment, even
though perpetrated by the employer to lessen the liability which would
be incurred in a suit at law, then there is no rational justification for
saying that intentional infliction of emotional distress arises out of the
employment, especially since both injuries are mental. 193 Finally, if the
fact situation concerning deceit in Ramey where an employer commit-
ted fraud to protect the company is considered not to be proximately
caused by the employment, then intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress cannot be realistically considered as being caused by a similar em-
ployment situation. 94 Thus, under the Ramey analogy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress would not come under the exclusive
remedies provisions of workers' compensation.
Since the entire class of nonphysical wrongs is outside the contem-
plation of the workers' compensation system, 195 none of those wrongs
should go even partially uncompensated merely becuase an element of
the damage is jurisdictionally subject to workers' compensation. It is
well established that the invasion of mental or emotional tranquility by
outrageous conduct is compensable at law whether or not accompanied
by physical manifestations of injury. 196 On the other hand, there is no
indication that invasion of mental or emotional tranquility is recover-
able or even contemplated to be recovered under workers' compensa-
tion.'97 Furthermore, the acceptance of intentional torts as being
within the purview of workers' compensation tends to encourage rather
than deter the commission of these outrageous acts since there is no
economic punishment other than the payment of workers' compensa-
tion insurance premiums. 198 Therefore, following the essence of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress that focuses on the
nonphysical mental injury, it is more in keeping with the purpose and
intent of the Workers' Compensation Act to allow a private action for
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See note 162 and accompanying text supra. See generally Nonphysical Torts, supra note
187, at 12-13, where Professor Larson states that:
if the essence of the tort in law is non-physical, and if the injuries are of the usual non-
physical sort, with physical injury added to the list of injuries solely as a makeweight, the
suit should not be barred. If the essence of the action is recovery for physical injury or
death, however, the action should be barred [under the workers' compensation exclusive
remedy provision] even if it can be cast in the form of a normally nonphysical tort.
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). It should be noted that while the analysis in this comment supports
the essence of the tort theory, the essence of the action theory is not supported.
196. See notes 114-116 and accompanying text supra.
197. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 106-109 and accompanying text supra.
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emotional distress. Although the Renteria court was not faced with the
situation where physical injuries coincided with the emotional distress,
the rationale employed by the court indicates that such injuries that are
compensable in a workers' compensation proceeding would be barred
from recovery in a common law action. This course of action would
best effectuate the policies of workers' compensation as well. The em-
ployee could be given cumulative remedies as compensation for two
distinct injuries, one emotional and the other physical. 99
As an alternative to cumulative remedies, the court could allow the
employee a choice of recoveries as in Magliulo.20 It is not enough to
say that Magliulo is inapplicable to an emotional distress situation
merely because it involved an assault.20 ' The facts may be inapposite,
but the reasoning is not. Clearly, intentional torts of a physical nature
are more likely to be within the parameters of workers' compensation
than are nonphysical torts, even assuming the latter include some ele-
ment of physical illness or disability. What legal justification allows
the employee-victim of an assault a choice of remedies while confining
the employee-victim of intentional outrageous conduct to workers'
compensation which cannot even remedy the dominant harm? No le-
gally defensible basis is apparent in such a proposition and the Mag-
liulo alternative would seem more consistent legally, short of allowing
cumulative remedies.
There is a further inconsistency to be noted in the reasoning used
both by the Ankeny and the Gates courts. Even though the Supreme
Court decision in Alcorn2 2 did not deal with the issue of the exclusivity
of workers' compensation,0 3 each of the two appellate court opinions
distinguished Alcorn in the same way the Renteria decision was distin-
guished; on the grounds that neither physical injury nor disability was
alleged.2 4 Such a distinction was clearly erroneous, however, in that
Alcorn expressly found some substance 20 5 to allegations of physical ill-
ness and disability in that decision.2°6 This finding shows the mistaken
reliance placed by the two lower court decisions upon a lack of alleged
199. This alternative admittedly creates a multiplicity of actions. It is this author's thought
that such a problem is inevitable in reaching the just result.
200. See 47 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 121 Cal. Rptr. 636.
201. See note 171 supra.
202. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
203. See id.
204. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492; 88 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. at
831.
205. See 2 Cal. 3d at 497-98, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90. (The court found enough
substance to the allegations to hold that a cause of action was stated.)
206. Id. at 497, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The court recounted that the plaintiff
alleged that he "was sick and ill for several weeks thereafter, was unable to work, and sustained
shock, nausea and insomnia." Id.
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physical illness and disability. The courts in Ankeny and Gates both
intimated that their decisions may have been different if Alcorn had
involved physical illness and disability. ° However, this distinction
was without merit in that Alcorn did involve allegations of physical
illness and disability.208
Though the courts in Renteria and Gates distinguished Ankeny factu-
ally2°9 in their denial of a common law action this distinction between
the cases did not warrant the results as stated above. Moreover, the
emotional distress decisions where physical illness and disability were
alleged have not taken into account the nature of the tort itself, the
possibility of alternative remedies, or the inappropriateness of the
workers' compensation remedy.210 As a consequence of this distinc-
tion, an entire class of nonphysical wrongs goes uncompensated.
Therefore, the Ankeny result is preferable to Renteria and Gates in that
it provides a remedy for this class of wrongs which is more in keeping
with the legislative intent behind the Workers' Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION
Currently, private actions for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress by an employee against an employer will be dismissed, should the
employee plead any physical illness or disability, pursuant to the exclu-
sivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.21 1 However, that
same employee pleading only emotional harm will be allowed to bring
an action at common law.21 2 To allow mere pleading technicalities to
be determinative of the result in this situation is incongruous at best,
particularly in view of the Workers' Compensation Act's emphasis
upon physical injury, while the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress involves an invasion of emotional tranquility.
The California judiciary should reconcile this inconsistency by al-
lowing actions for nonphysical, intentional torts to be pursued at com-
mon law while the physical injuries that result from nonintentional
work-related incidents should come within the sole jurisdiction of the
Workers' Compensation Act. This response by the courts is required to
effectuate the joint policies of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
common law of torts. The clarity achieved through implementing these
recommendations would bring order to an area of the law currently
207. See 93 Cal. App. 3d at 205-06, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492; 88 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 151 Cal.
Rptr. at 831.
208. See notes 205-206 supra.
209. See notes 172 and 183 supra.
210. See 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486; 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828.
211. See notes 165-166 supra.
212. See notes 146-151 supra.
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characterized by confusion. In the alternative, the legislature could act
to remedy the situation by stating that the Workers' Compensation Act
does not include intentional torts, especially intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Joseph H Fagundes

